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CoNTRACTs-CoNSIDERATION-EFFECT oF OPTION To WITHDRAW GoVERN-

SURPLUS PROPERTY FROM SALE-The Office of Surplus Property accepted defendant's bid for a quantity of sodium carbonate. Submitted on the
appropriate government form, the bid was subject to a condition which gave
the government " • . . the right to withdraw from sale any property prior to
the removal thereof without incurring any liability except to refund to the
purchaser any amount paid with respect to the said property." Although the
sodium carbonate had not been withdravvn from sale, the defendant refused
to perform his promise to buy it. The government brought an action for
damages, and the defense was that no contract e.'aSted because there was no
mutuality of obligation. Held, the contention that the contract lacked mutuality
was without merit. United States 11. Weisbrod, (7th Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d)
629.
Although the opinion in the principal case contains the suggestion that
contracts for the disposal of surplus defense property by the government present
an atypical situation,1 the defendant's liability is assumed for the purpose of
this note to have been based solely on the conclusion that there was mutuality
of obligation. "Mutuality of obligation" is a misleading way of referring to
the need for enforceable promises as consideration in the usual bilateral contract.2 illusory promises do not curtail the promisor's freedom of action and
for that reason cannot be enforced; they therefore do not constitute consideration.3 If the promise of one of the parties to a bilateral contract is
illusory, the contract lacks mutuality of obligation because both parties are
MENT

1 Principal case at 632.
2 Gms~10RB, CoNTRACTS §68 (1947); 1 CoRBm, CONTRACTS §152 (1950); 1 Wn.LISTON, CoNTitACTS, rev. ed., §141 (1936).
3 See Corbin, "The Effect of Options on Considetation," 34 Y.AI:B L.J. 571 (1925).
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not bound by enforceable promises. Thus if A promises to sell a bushel of
apples to B unless he changes his mind, A really has promised nothing; he
can change his mind at any time and for any reason.4 The same result obtains
if B promises to buy an unspecified quantity of apples from A.5 The promise
is not illusory, however, if the exercise of :A's option to change his mind is
dependent upon the happening of some event over which he does not have
complete control.6 For e.'i:ample, if A promises to sell B a bushel of apples
unless his car is struck by lightning, A's freedom of action is limited and his
promise is enforceable; A must sell the apples unless lightning strikes his car.
Nor is a promise illusory if A gives something of value for the option of
changing his mind: 7 if A pays or promises to pay twenty-five cents for the
option of deciding whether or not to sell B the bushel of apples which B has
promised to buy, a contract results. Although an illusory promise does not
constitute consideration, it is of course not necessary that a promise be equivalent
in value to the consideration given by the other party in order to form a binding
bilateral contract.8 A's promise to give Ba piece of paper would be consideration
for B's promise to buy one bushel of apples.9 A fortiori, A's promise either
to sell the apples to B or, in the alternative, to give B a piece of paper containing notice of an election to exercise his option not to sell would constitute
consideration. Accordingly, a contract is formed if B promises to buy the
apples and if A combines a promise to sell unless he changes his mind with
a promise to notify B of his change of mind.10 The consideration is even more
evident when A's promise to notify B must be performed within a stated period

4American Agricultural Chemical Co. v. Kennedy and Crawford, 103 Va. 171, 48
S.E. 868 (1904). See R. F. Baker Co. v. Ballentine and Sons, 127 Conn. 680, 20 A.
(2d) 82 (1941); Bendix Home Appliances, Inc. v. Radio Accessories Co., (8th Cir. 1942)
129 F. (2d) 177; 1 CoNrnACTs REsTATEMJlNT §79, comment b, illus. 1 (1932); 137
A.L.R. 919 (1942).
:; Willard, Sutherland and Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 489, 43 S.Ct. 592 (1923).
o Hunt v. Stimson, (6th Cir. 1928) 23 F. (2d) 447; Chevrolet Motor Co. v. Gladding,
(4th Cir. 1930) 42 F. (2d) 440; Central Trust Co. of illinois v. Chicago Auditorium
Assn., 240 U.S. 581, 36 S.Ct. 412 (1916).
7Reech v. Caloy Corp., 329 Mich. 453, 45 N.W: (2d) 349 (1951); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Rau Construction Co., (8th Cir. 1942) 130 F. (2d) 499. Contra, Velie
l\fotor Car Co. v. Kopmeier Motor Car Co., (7th Cir. 1912) 194 F. 324.
s Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Martin, (3d Cir. 1924) l F. (2d) 687.
o Haigh v. Brooks, IO Ad. & E. 309, 113 Eng. Rep. 119 (1839).
10 Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., (2d Cir. 1940) 116 F. (2d)
675; Realty Advertising and Supply Co. v. Englebert Tyre Co., 89 Misc. 371, 151 N.Y.S.
885 (1915). The result would be the same as if both parties to the contract combined an
option to cancel with a promise to notify. Fawcett v. Fawcett, 191 N.C. 679, 132 S.E. 796
(1926); J. R. Watkins v. Rich, 254 Mich. 82, 235 N.W. 845 (1931). Specific performance in equity, however, ordinarily will not be available when the contract gives one of
the parties the right to cancel. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Orange Crush Co., (5th
Cir. 1924) 296 F. 693 (1924). This is on the theory that since one of the parties can
cancel the contract at his pleasure, there is no mutuality of remedy. Rust v. Conrad, 47
Mich. 449, 11 N.W. 265 (1882). Annotation, 22 A.L.R. (2d) 508 (1952). But see
Cincinnati Exhibition Co. v. Marsans, (D.C. Mo. 1914) 216 F. 269.
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of time.11 A's promise to sell to B unless he changes his mind combined with
a promise to sell the apples to no one other than B likewise limits his freedom
of action and therefore satisfies the consideration requirement.12
The results indicated above seem clear when the promises are stated expressly in the contract. When they are not express, however, the courts sometimes will £nd that they are implied. Although the decisions are by no means
uniform, the proper circumstances for such an implication seem to be where
(1) the parties intended to obligate themselves by an enforceable agreement,
and (2) they intended the implied promise to be a part of their contract.13
In the situation presented by the principal case, consideration could be found
to exist in an implied promise to give notice of an election to withdraw the
sodium carbonate from sale.14 The same result could be reached by £nding an
implied promise to sell to no one other than to the promisee;16 this seems
especially plausible since the terms of the contract required the government
to withdraw the sodium carbonate from sale if it decided not to sell it to the
defendant. A legal detriment also could be found in the fact that the
government's option to withdraw had to be exercised before the defendant's
removal of the property.16 Since the parties probably intended to be bound
when they entered into the agreement and since the seller's option to withdraw was a part of the bargained-for consideration,17 the court's decision can
be justified on both authority and principle.

Arthur M. Wisehart, S.Ed.

11 Realty Advertising and Supply Co. v. Englebert Tyre Co., note 10 supra; Phalanx
Air Freight, Inc. v. National Skyway Freight Coi:p., 104 Cal. App. (2d) 771, 232 P. (2d)
510 (1951).
12Brodsky v. George H. Mom! Co., 237 Mass. 86, 129 N.E. 359 (1921).
1s Sylvan Crest Sand and Gravel Co. v. United States, (2d Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d)
642.
14 Sylvan Crest Sand and G:ravel Co. v. United States, note 13 supra; Gurfein v.
Werbelovsky, 97 Conn. 703, 118 A. 32 (1922).
.
15 Burgess Sulphite Fibre Co. v. Philip Broomfield, 180 Mass. 283, 62 N.E. 367
(1902); 1 WILI.IsToN, CoNTRAars, rev. ed., §104 (1936). Contra, Midland Steel Sales
Co. v. Waterloo Gasoline Engine Co., (8th Cir. 1925) 9 F. (2d) 250.
10 Gurfein v. Werbelovsky, note 14 supra; North and Judd Mfg. Co. v. United States,
(Ct. Cl. 1949) 84 F. Supp. 649.
.
11 See McCoy v. Pastorius, 125 Colo. 574, 246 P. (2d) 611 (1952).

